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I examine explanations’ realist commitments in relation to dynamical systems theory. First
I rebut an ‘explanatory indispensability argument’ for mathematical realism from the ex-
planatory power of phase spaces. Then I critically consider a possible way of strengthen-
ing the indispensability argument by reference to attractors in dynamical systems theory.
The take-home message is that understanding of the modal character of explanations (in
dynamical systems theory) can undermine Platonist arguments from explanatory indispens-
ability.1. Introduction. Many scientiﬁc explanations use theoretical resources of
highly contested ontological status. There are countless explanations that make
essential use of idealizations, abstractions, and mathematics, for example. On
the one hand, scientists typically adopt a broadly instrumentalist attitude to-
ward these aspects of explanations. Even scientists of an ambitiously realist
bent do not commit themselves uniformly to everything employed in scien-
tiﬁc explanations. Many philosophers also regard the abstract and idealized
features of explanations as playing a broadly instrumental role, even when
they take explanations to latch onto unobservable reality in deeply explana-
tory ways.
On the other hand, others follow a broadly Quinean lead to issues of real-
ism and ontological commitment and argue for realist commitment to math-
ematics or other contestable features of explanations on the grounds of their
indispensable explanatory utility. So-called explanatory indispensability argu-
ments have been advanced in this spirit with respect to mathematics, idealiza-
tions, abstractions, and emergence, for example (see, e.g., Baker 2009; Psillos
2010, 2011; Lyon 2012). It has been argued that realists’ selective instrumen-
talism about such indispensable features of explanations is only a matter of an*To contact the author please write to: Woodhouse Lane, Leeds LS2 9JT, United King-
dom; e-mail: J.T.Saatsi@leeds.ac.uk.
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DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND EXPLANATORY INDISPENSABILITY 893unjustiﬁable bias for features of reality that are causally explanatory, serve a
metaphysical reductionist ideology, or have clearly identiﬁable locations in
space and time.
Various speciﬁc debates around explanatory indispensability exemplify
this juxtaposition on a deep central issue: what are explanations’ realist
commitments? I believe that one of the key reasons these debates continue
unabated is that they are often conducted (too) independently of a sufﬁciently
clear sense of what scientiﬁc explanations amount to. The main message of
this article is that the way forward is to conduct these debates in relation to
sufﬁciently well-articulated philosophical accounts of explanation. This is a
very broad thesis that I cannot hope to defend in general terms in a short ar-
ticle. Instead, I will support it by criticizing in this spirit a speciﬁc explanatory
indispensability argument for mathematical realism in order to demonstrate
the broader lesson.
Realist reasoning from explanatory indispensability varies in its details
from case to case, but we can abstract away from these details and present
the central line of thought in general terms. In the context of explanatorily
indispensable mathematics, this yields a schematic explanatory indispensabil-
ity argument (EIA; Baker 2009, 613):
(P1) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays
an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientiﬁc theories.
(P2) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in sci-
ence.
(C) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathemat-
ical objects.
The main objective of this article is to bring out some unwarranted pre-
suppositions of this line of thought. Thus presented, the gist of the problem
is that P1 has very little going for it from the perspective of a well-motivated
philosophical account of explanation. That is, given what we know about the
nature of explanations, there are very good reasons not to adopt a blank com-
mitment to any feature of reality that plays an indispensable explanatory role.
Alternatively, we can take issue with P2: from said perspective, there is little
point to speak bluntly of ‘indispensable explanatory role’without further clar-
iﬁcation as to the speciﬁc nature of that role. Given what we know about ex-
planations, ‘indispensable explanatory role’ can mean different things, only
some of which support realist commitment.
I will bring out these issues with EIA by focusing on a particular explan-
atory indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism that capitalizes
on the explanatory power of phase spaces (Lyon and Colyvan 2007). Al-
though this argument is often mentioned in the literature, it has hitherto es-
caped the right kind of critical attention. I will ﬁrst present the argument andThis content downloaded from 129.011.022.236 on July 17, 2018 05:47:02 AM
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All udiscuss its shortcomings from the perspective of a modal-dependence view
of explanation, according to which explanations provide information about
how the explanandum depends on the explanans (sec. 2).1 I will then con-
sider a way of substantially strengthening the argument by reference to the
explanatory role of attractors in dynamical systems theory (sec. 3). From
the modal-dependence view of explanation—which, I will go on to suggest,
is a live option with respect to the kinds of explanation at stake—this strength-
ening fails to shore up the Platonist conclusion (sec. 4). I will conclude with
broader reﬂections regarding explanatory indispensability in connection with
a modal perspective on explanation to motivate the broader thesis expounded
above (sec. 5).
2. The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces. Lyon and Colyvan (2007)
argue that models in dynamical systems theory, in Hamiltonian classical
mechanics in particular, provide an example of explanatory mathematics
that can support mathematical realism via EIA. In dynamical systems the-
ory, mathematics can play an indispensable role in the presentation of phase
spaces and their explanatory features. Points of a phase space represent a con-
tinuously inﬁnite range of possible instantaneous dynamical states of a phys-
ical system, and trajectories through these points represent the system’s pos-
sible time evolutions. In dynamical systems theory, mathematics provides an
indispensable means for presenting such modal information and theorizing
about it in various ways.
Lyon and Colyvan (2007) emphasize the explanatory import of phase
spaces in order to amplify Malament’s (1982) objection to Field’s (1980)
nominalism. Malament challenged Field’s program, arguing that Field is
not entitled to quantify over possible dynamical states in theories that trade
in phase spaces. A nominalist might respond to Malament by shifting focus
to an empirically equivalent Lagrangian formulation, which does not rely on
phase space structures and hence is more amenable to nominalization à la
Field. Against this move, Lyon andColyvan argue that Hamiltonianmechan-
ics still raises serious issues for the nominalist due to its indispensable ex-
planatory virtues: pointing to an alternative, potentially nominalizable pre-
sentation of dynamical systems arguably does not help the nominalist, if there
are some features of the world that we can explain only with an account re-
lying on phase spaces.
As an example of such phase space explanation, Lyon and Colyvan point
to the Hénon-Heiles model. This is a well-known, very simple, and widely ap-
plied model of nonlinear systems that can be used to study and explain chaotic
features of various kinds of systems with 2 degrees of freedom. (Hénon and1. See Woodward (2003) for a modal-dependence view of causal explanations and Reut-
linger (2015) for a modal-dependence view of noncausal explanations.
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DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND EXPLANATORY INDISPENSABILITY 895Heiles used it to model the motion of a star, conﬁned to a plane, around a
galactic center.) The Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian can be written as a function
of momenta px,y and spatial coordinates x, y as
H 5
1
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x2 1 y2ð Þ 1 x2y 2 y
3
3
:
In dynamical systems theory, solutions of the equations of motion (derivable
from the Hamiltonian) are typically studied via a Poincaré map.2 This allows
one to study, for example, the relative prominence of chaotic versus regular
solutions of the Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian as a function of the total energy of
the system as a control parameter that a modeler can vary (see Hilborn 2000;
for Hamiltonian systems energy is constant). Lyon and Colyvan argue that this
kind of information about chaotic versus regular solutions can be explanatory
and that it would be impossible to extract this information from an alternative
Lagrangian description of the same system. Thus, the Hamiltonian formula-
tion, with its use of phase spaces, gains an explanatory edge.
What empirical phenomenon can only be explained in these terms? Lyon
and Colyvan point to the fact that for systems well modeled by Hénon-
Heiles equations “high-energy Hénon-Heiles systems tend to exhibit chaotic
and unpredictable motion, and low-energy Hénon-Heiles systems tend to ex-
hibit regular and predictable motion” (2007, 237). This fact can arguably be
explained by the Hénon-Heiles model (studied via the Poincaré map), which
shows “how the regions of possible dynamical states that give rise to chaotic
motion change as the total energy of the system changes” (237). Thus, the Ham-
iltonian analysis of such a system can explain and give us understanding not
available otherwise: “The explanatory power is in the structure of the phase
space and the Poincaré map. So it seems that this is a case where using the
phase space is essential to our understanding and ability to explain certain fea-
tures of the world” (238).
In particular, without the Hamiltonian analysis we do not understand how
the structure of the phase space changes—how stable large-scale features of
the phase space emerge and grow—as the total energy decreases. It is impor-
tant to note that the explanandum at stake does not concern any particular
trajectory through phase space; it does not concern any particular event or reg-
ularity that could be associated with an actual system. Rather, it concerns
structural features of phase space: a system’s ‘tendency’ to exhibit regular or
chaotic behavior is a matter of how it relates to a relevant class of other pos-
sible trajectories. The Poincaré map analysis of the Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian2. A Poincaré section is a lower-dimensional subspace of a phase space, transversal to
the dynamical ﬂow of the system. A Poincaré map is the intersection of a periodic orbit
with a Poincaré section. It is a useful tool in analyzing a dynamical system since it pre-
serves many properties of the trajectories of the original system.
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All uexplains this tendency in terms of changes in the relative proportion of chaotic
versus regular trajectories, as a function of the system’s energy (ﬁg. 1).
Granting the explanatory utility of phase spaces, one may nevertheless ques-
tion whether mathematics is in any substantial sense involved in the explana-
tion. Admittedly it seems to provide an indispensable means to represent all
the possible dynamical states and possible trajectories and, more important,
how the properties of the trajectories—being chaotic versus regular—depend
on systems’ energy. But what seems to matter for the explanation itself, really,
is a wealth of information regarding possible trajectories.
Lyon and Colyvan anticipate this move, but they regard it as illegitimate
for the nominalist: “points in phase spaces are abstract objects that represent
other abstract objects (possible dynamical states)” (2007, 233, my emphasis).
A nominalist who wishes to place the explanatory burden on possible dynam-
ical states and trajectories achieves a pyrrhic victory at best: trading quanti-
ﬁcation over mathematical abstracta for quantiﬁcation over possibilia cannot
save the nominalist day.3
How convincing is this rebuttal of the nominalist move? This depends on
one’s view of the explanation at stake. The rebuttal does not elucidate math-
ematics’ function in the explanation, nor does it show that mathematics is do-
ing any real explanatory work. Prima facie, the explanatory work is done by
purported facts about possible systems. Furthermore, the involvement of such
modal facts is far from surprising, given that the explanandum itself makes
reference to modal features. Recall Lyon and Colyvan’s question: why is it
that systems well modeled by the Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian tend to increas-
ingly exhibit chaotic and unpredictable motion at higher energies? This ques-
tion is not about any actual solution of the Hamiltonian equations of motion.
It is about a whole large class of possible solutions. It is not fully clear how a
trajectory’s ‘tendency’ to be chaotic/regular should be interpreted exactly, but
however it is precisiﬁed, it will surely involve reference to nonactual trajec-
tories. Given that the explanandum is thus modally laden, one readily expects
the explanans to involve similar modal content as well—hence, the appeal
to nonactual trajectories in the explanation. A nominalist should not ﬁnd this
‘explanatory power of possibilia’ extraordinary or surprising at all. The nom-
inalist can argue, furthermore, that the Hamiltonian formulation provides an
economical way—the only way that is even nearly economical enough for
limited beings such as ourselves—to represent the relevant modal features.3. Similarly, Baker and Colyvan (2011, 328) lament: “Mathematical nominalists eschew
mathematical objects because of epistemic and other problems associated with admitting
them into one’s ontology. Avoiding commitment to mathematical objects at the expense
of admitting possible worlds is simply not a good deal.” It is a contestable issue how quan-
tiﬁcation over possibilia amounts to antinominalism, however. Indeed, there are well-
developed modal nominalist accounts of mathematics itself, aiming to eschew commit-
ment to mathematical objects in modal terms (e.g., Hellman 1989; Chihara 1990).
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All uWhat about realist commitment to abstract possibilia, then? Can the nom-
inalist get off the hook here? This issue is too large to be fully dealt with here,
but let me indicate why the upshot is far from clear. The issue turns on how
we should understand the nature of the explanation at stake. Lyon and Colyvan
say nothing about this, apart from noting that the explanation is not causal.
While they are surely right about this, it is still natural to try to account for
the explanation in the spirit of a counterfactual, modal-dependence view of
explanation (see Reutlinger 2015; Saatsi 2016b). After all, the explanation
clearly provides information of the requisite sort: a trajectory’s tendency to be
chaotic (or otherwise) depends on the system’s energy and its initial conditions
(in relation to the area of phase space to which the trajectory belongs—i.e.,
whether a trajectory is within one of the ‘islands’ of regular trajectories).
The explanatory analysis of the Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian in terms of the
Poincaré map allows us to grasp explanatorily relevant modal features of the
system being represented. Arguably this is how we explain and gain explan-
atory understanding. As Lyon and Colyvan note, the phase space approach
puts us in a position to relate the actual state of affairs, which is represented,
in an idealized way, by a particular solution, to a whole network of nonactual
possibilities. In the Hénon-Heiles model this amounts to seeing certain course-
grained features of the phase space (e.g., areas of phase space dominated by
regular or chaotic solutions) and how these features are altered under changes
in the control parameter E (energy). This kind of modal information is natu-
rally construed as the kind of ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ information
that Woodward and others have emphasized being at the heart of explana-
tory understanding. Admittedly the changes in the parameter E are not caus-
ally connected to the explanandum. But given the nature of the explanandum
(‘tendency to be chaotic’) this is far from surprising. The noncausal nature of
the explanatory dependence need not be problematic from the perspective of
the counterfactual view of explanation: it has been argued in various other
contexts that there are good reasons to liberalize the notion of ‘explanatory
counterfactual’ from its causal connotations and apply the modal-dependence
framework beyond causal explanation (see, e.g., Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Reut-
linger 2015; Saatsi 2016a).
Thinking about the explanatory capacity of the Hénon-Heiles model in
modal terms begins to throw new light on the explanatory virtues of phase
space formulation of dynamical systems and the role that quantiﬁcation over
possibilia plays in such explanations. Such quantiﬁcation may be ontologi-
cally committing from the perspective of the deductive nomological model,
perhaps, if we assume that explanatory success requires that all the explanans
are simply true. From the perspective of modal accounts of explanation, how-
ever, there is scope for the nominalist to fully endorse the explanatory impor-
tance of modal information. This leads to a natural extension of a popular ‘in-
dexing’ strategy against indispensability arguments. The gist of the indexingThis content downloaded from 129.011.022.236 on July 17, 2018 05:47:02 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND EXPLANATORY INDISPENSABILITY 899strategy is to maintain that mathematics only plays a straightforwardly rep-
resentational role of indexing physical properties, thereby radically enhanc-
ing theories’ expressive powers (e.g., Melia 2000; Daly and Langford 2009).
Consider, for instance, the representational power of mathematical Euclidean
space R3 as indexing numerous physical facts about spatial distances, angles,
and so on. The indexing strategy needs to be extended here, however, since
the modal information involved in the Hénon-Heiles model concerns non-
actual states and structures thereof: the mathematical points and structures
of phase space must be viewed as indexing representations of (nonactual)
possibilities regarding physical variables. The modal information gained
through such representations can be explanatory vis-à-vis an actual trajectory
by virtue of providing appropriate kinds of modal information about explan-
atory dependencies.
As said, Lyon and Colyvan anticipate and object to this move as involv-
ing an illegitimate appeal to possibilia. They dismiss the ‘modalized’ index-
ing maneuver too quickly, however. For even if this move does not win the
war, it might still win the battle, so to speak. First of all, from the standpoint
of modal accounts of explanation one expects modal information concerning
nonactual states of affair to feature centrally in scientiﬁc explanations. This
makes clear the explanatory virtue of mathematical representations of dynam-
ical systems that are geared toward displaying the relevant kind of modal in-
formation. Second, the nominalist admittedly needs to offer an account of the
relevant explanatory counterfactuals that these representations informus about.
But this is a different battle, one that the nominalist faces in any case, inde-
pendently of phase space theories. Science is full of representations of non-
actual states of affairs that are absolutely indispensable for explaining, and ex-
amples of mathematical explanations add little to the pressure the nominalist
should already feel to account for these representations, if we can regard these
mathematical explanations merely as indexing such nonactual states of phys-
ical affairs.
Lyon and Colyvan’s phase space argument for Platonism thus seems in-
conclusive at best: it is not enough for (mathematical) EIA to point to explan-
atorily indispensable modal facts. However, dynamical systems theory provides
interesting opportunities to push further the dialectic between the Platonist
and the nominalist, as I next discuss.
3. The Explanatory Power of Attractors. The Hénon-Heiles model is but
an isolated example of dynamical systems theory in explanatory action, and
a broader look at a variety of explanations offered by analytical models of
dynamical systems suggests an alternative focus for the Platonist argument.
In particular, it allows the Platonist to zoom in on explanations that essentially
involve mathematics that seemingly cannot be interpreted as representing (or
‘indexing’) anything physical at all, actual or otherwise.This content downloaded from 129.011.022.236 on July 17, 2018 05:47:02 AM
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structs are phase space attractors: sets of points of the phase space of a dy-
namical system (identiﬁed by its equations of motion) that are long-term sta-
ble, that is, points toward which the system’s dynamical behavior is attracted
after shorter-term behavior has died down. Attractors are abstract mathemat-
ical objects, but their geometrical, topological, and other properties can reveal
explanatory information about a system’s dynamical behavior. A simple damped
harmonic oscillator has a ﬁxed point as its attractor, while a dissipative anhar-
monic oscillator can have a periodic limit cycle attractor, for example. Of spe-
cial interest are strange attractors: aperiodic limiting solutions of a dissipative
system toward which all solutions (within a basin of attraction) asymptotically
approach. (The Lorenz attractor is a well-known example from nonlinear sys-
tems theory.)
In dynamical systems theory, attractors are used to explain various quali-
tative and quantitative features of long-term dynamic behavior (see, e.g., Stro-
gatz 1994; Hilborn 2000). For example, features of attractors can explain how
chaotic systems can from very different starting points tend toward behavior
that is similar with respect to those features, despite the trajectories being at
the same time highly sensitive to initial conditions. A dissipative dynamical
system can exhibit coarse-grained features of a ‘two-winged’ Lorenz attractor
in the long term, for example, despite starting from very different places in the
phase space (within the basin of attraction).4 The onset of chaos in a determin-
istic system is also standardly explained in terms that appeal to attractors and
their sudden qualitative change (‘bifurcation’) under a change in a control pa-
rameter. Also, the universality of a particular way in which microphysically
very different systems start exhibiting chaotic behavior (e.g., via period dou-
bling) is explained in terms of attractors. Long story short: strange attractors are
indispensable for explaining various features of nonlinear dynamical systems.
(For detailed examples, see Strogatz [1994] andHilborn [2000]. For philosoph-
ical discussion, see Smith [1998].)
Despite their explanatory power, there are very good reasons to not take
strange attractors to represent a speciﬁc set of possible initial conditions of a
dynamical system. The issue is that these attractors have an inﬁnitely ﬁne-
grained, self-similar fractal structure that cannot correspond to the structure
of possible states of physical systems individuated with much more coarse-
grained dynamical properties. As Smith (1998) clearly explains, strange at-
tractors play an indispensable explanatory role with respect to nonlinear sys-
tems with dynamical quantities such as ﬂuid circulation velocity, temperature,
the proportional concentration of a chemical in a mixture, and so on. These are
macroscopic, ‘averaged’ quantities that clearly cannot have indeﬁnitely precise4. The basin of attraction is deﬁned as the set of phase space points that are attracted
toward an attractor in the long term.
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DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND EXPLANATORY INDISPENSABILITY 901real number values required for the structure of a strange attractor. Averaged
properties such as temperature at a point P in a ﬂuid simply cannot have per-
fectly determinate values, even notwithstanding the fact that ‘zooming in’ the
physical structure ﬂuid at some point gives rise to the quantum world (see
Smith 1998, chap. 3). Yet it is the dynamics of these kinds of quantities that
strange attractors are used to explain.
In response to this puzzle he raises, Smith (1998) argues that strange at-
tractors are mere mathematical by-products of a theoretical description that
latches onto more robust, more coarse-grained dynamical features of physical
systems.5 Koperski (2001) argues in a similar vein that strange attractors are
indispensable idealizations, mathematical by-products of the fact that we must
use differential equations in the mathematical modeling of dynamical systems
needed to explain their dynamical behaviors. I am sympathetic to this way of
thinking about attractors, but it is worth noting that neither of these authors
provides any philosophical account of the explanations inwhich attractors thus
ﬁgure.6 Furthermore, such an account is needed in order to see what we should
make of the explanatory indispensability of attractors vis-à-vis EIA, in order
to not simply beg the question against an advocate of EIA. I will next suggest
that a modal-dependence view provides a natural way to account for the key
features of these explanations. This matters in the context of EIA, since the
ontological commitments of strange attractors are not at all obvious from this
modal perspective, as wewill see by reﬂecting more generally on realist com-
mitments of the modal-dependence view of explanation.
4. Explanatory Dependencies in Dynamical Systems. As we have seen,
the explanatory role played by attractors provides an interesting opportunity
to push further the Platonist argument, since the ‘modalized’ indexing move
is no longer an option: attractors do not as such represent anything physical,
actual or otherwise. There is a different response the nominalist can make
here, however. The nominalist can maintain, building on Smith (1998) and
Koperski (2001), that explanatory heavy lifting in the study of chaotic sys-
tems is done by features of the mathematical models that are much less ﬁne
grained than attractors themselves. The latter are to be regarded as mere math-
ematical by-products of models that are explanatory by virtue of latching onto
appropriatemodal facts, captured by explanatory regularities concerning changes
in more coarse-grained aspects of a target system as a function of a control pa-
rameter.5. In particular, for Smith a strange attractor is a sign of a ‘stretching-and-folding’ pro-
cess of trajectories that result in fractals only if taken to the inﬁnite limit. The stretching-
and-folding processes latch onto an actual system in an explanatory way.
6. Providing such an account is an open philosophical issue. Bishop (2015) very brieﬂy
toys with some options.
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dx
dt
5 10 y 2 xð Þ,
dy
dt
5 rx 2 y 2 xz,
dz
dt
5 xy 2
8z
3
:
Solutions of these equations can behave in radically different ways in their
coarse-grained features for different values of the adjustable parameter r.
When these equations are used to model the well-known phenomenon of
Rayleigh-Bènard convection, for example, r can be identiﬁed as being directly
proportional to the constant temperature difference between two parallel sur-
faces containing the convection. In an experimental setting, this temperature dif-
ference (and hence r) is a control parameter that can be manipulated to change
the nature of the convection. Lorenz equations, and their associated two-winged
Lorenz attractor, can thus be used in explaining (and predicting) features of
Rayleigh-Bènard convection by capturing the dependencies of various coarse-
grained aspects of the physical phenomenon on the temperature difference (see
Smith 1998, sec. 4.5, for discussion).
The Lorenz attractor, which represents, for example, the long-term shape
and general location of phase space trajectories of the relevant state variables,
can itself be regarded as an idealization and mathematical surplus. But this
does not take away the fact that this mathematical construct is an indispensable
component of best explanations of the chaotic behavior of Rayleigh-Bènard
convection. And it does not mean that attractors’ explanatory indispensabil-
ity should elicit realist commitment to either the mathematics involved or some
feature of the world directly represented by them (with respect to either actual
or possible systems, as the ‘indexing’ move would have it). This is because
there are other ways to understand attractors’ role in explanations.
Themodal-dependence view on explanation, in particular, can help the nom-
inalist to gain the upper hand in the dialectic against the Platonist. From this
perspective we can regard the power of explanations of chaotic behavior as re-
siding in information about modal dependencies between more coarse-grained,
physically well-deﬁned variables. Explanations of real world systems in terms
of models featuring strange attractors do not relate any explanandum variable
to the inﬁnitely ﬁne-grained features of the attractor: as far as explanatory mod-
els of nonlinear systems are concerned, no feature of physical systems depends
on the ﬁne-grained features of attractors. Rather, the explanatory dependences
hold between more coarse-grained features that are naturally represented by
coarse-grained features of the attractors. For example, explanations of chaotic
behavior often capture the way in which abrupt changes (bifurcations) in theThis content downloaded from 129.011.022.236 on July 17, 2018 05:47:02 AM
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DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND EXPLANATORY INDISPENSABILITY 903more coarse-grained features take place in response to a change in a control
variable that can typically be regarded as a (broadly speaking) manipulable
variable in the spirit of Woodward (2003). Since the modeling of these dy-
namical systems requires differential equations, the mathematics automatically
leads to geometrical structures like strange attractors that then naturally obtain
a representational role with respect to the more coarse-grained features of phase
space that are modally connected to other variables in an explanatory way.
5. Broader Reﬂections. I have argued elsewhere in much more general
terms that explanations’ realist commitments are best understood and analyzed
in relation to well-formed ideas about what it is to explain (Saatsi 2016b). This
commonsensical point has been ignored in debates about explanatory indis-
pensability for too long. The reason why well-formed ideas about explanation
matter is that inmodal accounts of explanation, for example, explanatory indis-
pensability turns out to be insufﬁcient in and of itself for justifying ontological
commitment. I have tried to explicate this in general terms in Saatsi (2016b),
through a distinction between different kinds of explanatory roles: some ‘thick’
andontologicallycommitting, others ‘thin’andontologicallyperipheral.This
is a way to reconcile the idea that mathematics can indispensably contribute
to an explanation yet at the same time not be ontologically committing.
Here I have argued in this spirit that the modal-dependence perspective on
the explanations furnished by dynamical systems theory can also undermine the
argument from Lyon and Colyvan (2007), even when this argument is strength-
ened with reference to features of dynamical systems theory—strange attrac-
tors—that cannot be dealt with by the standard nominalist strategy of ‘indexing’.REFERENCES
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